In n-agent exchange economies, we show that all efficient and continuous rules are "diagonally dictatorial" over the restricted domain of linear preferences and, in the 2-good case, over the domain of homothetic preferences. The diagonal dictator receives the entire endowment whenever all agents have an identical preference. We show that (fully) dictatorial rules are the only rules satisfying, in addition, veto-proofness, the requirement that if truth-telling ever leads to the worst outcome for an agent, he shouldn't be able to escape it, by misrepresenting his preference. The same conclusion holds replacing veto-proofness with stronger notions of non-manipulability, veto-proofness * (no one can escape from the worst outcome or switch to the best outcome), weak strategy-proofness (no one can increase his bundle), and strategy-proofness. We extend these results to any larger domain imposing non-bossiness (no one can affect others' bundles without affecting his own).
Introduction
In exchange economies, an allocation rule, or simply a rule, associates with each profile of preferences a single feasible allocation. An allocation is (Pareto) efficient if no one can be made better off without anyone else being made worse off. The Pareto correspondence maps each preference profile into the set of all efficient allocations. An efficient rule is a selection from the Pareto correspondence. We study continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence, or efficient and continuous rules, and, in particular, these rules satisfying the following notions of non-manipulability.
Strategy-proofness is the requirement that no one can benefit by misrepresenting his preference, independently of others' representations (Gibbard, 1973 , Satterthwaite, 1975 . We introduce three weaker notions of non-manipulability, which pertain to three cases of partially strategic agents. The first case is that each agent behaves cooperatively representing his preference truthfully, unless he is treated worst. Veto-proofness is the requirement that if truth-telling ever leads to the worst outcome for an agent, he shouldn't be able to escape it, by misrepresenting his preference. A stronger notion, veto-proofness * , pertains to the case that each agent represents his preference truthfully, unless he can escape from the worst outcome or can switch to the best outcome. The last notion, weak strategy-proofness, pertains to the case that each agent represents his preference truthfully, unless he can increase his bundle in terms of vector dominance relation.
We show that over the restricted domain of "linear preferences" (preferences with linear utility function), every efficient and continuous rule is diagonally dictatorial, that is, there exists an agent who receives the social endowment, whenever all agents have the same preference. Therefore, for any domain including the linear domain, there exists no efficient and continuous rule satisfying any one of the following standard equity criteria, equal treatment of equals (any two agents with the same preference should be treated the same), no-envy (Foley, 1967 ; no one should prefer any of others' bundles to his own), etc. 1 We next show that over the linear domain, a rule is efficient, continuous, and veto-proof if and only if it is dictatorial, that is, there exists an agent who always receives the social endowment, leaving nothing for anyone else. The same result holds replacing veto-proofness with any one of veto-proofness bundle without affecting his own bundle) introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) . Given any domain including the linear domain, we show that a rule is efficient, continuous, veto-proof * (or weakly strategy-proof ), and non-bossy if and only if it is dictatorial. Since all linear preferences are "homothetic", this result applies to the domain of homothetic preferences, or the homothetic domain, which is widely considered in various applications (Chipman, 1974, and Chipman and Moore, 1973 ). In the 2-good case, we establish the following two stronger results over the homothetic domain: we show that every efficient and continuous rule is diagonally dictatorial and that a rule is efficient, continuous, and veto-proof if and only if it is dictatorial. The second result holds replacing veto-proofness with veto-proofness * or weak strategy-proofness or strategy-proofness.
For the unrestricted domain of abstract social choice, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard, 1973 , Satterthwaite, 1975 states that if a rule is strategy-proof and "onto", then it is dictatorial.
2
Since in economic applications, preferences are subject to a variety of restrictions, the theorem does not apply. 3 However a number of studies have brought out similar difficulties in satisfying efficiency and strategy-proofness in standard exchange economies. 4 In particular, for the 2-agent case, under "classical" assumptions on preferences, Zhou (1991) shows that a rule is efficient and strategy-proof if and only if it is dictatorial. Schummer (1997) strengthens this result by establishing it over the two restricted domains of homothetic preferences and linear preferences, respectively. Ju (2002) identifies general domain conditions leading to this impossibility result.
There are well-known difficulties in extending this negative result in the 2-agent case to the n-agent case: see Zhou (1991) and Kato and Ohseto (2001) for conjectures in the n-agent case. We contribute to this line of research by showing that over each of the two restricted domains, the linear domain and the 2-good homothetic domain, when continuity is required additionally, the negative result extends to the n-agent case.
In the n-agent case, important contributions have been made in the three recent works by Serizawa (2000a) , Serizawa (2000b) , and Serizawa and Wey-2 A rule is onto if its range is equal to the set of all social alternatives. In the abstract social choice model, if a rule is Pareto efficient, then it is onto. Moreover, as is well-known (see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995), if a rule is onto and strategy-proof, then it is Pareto efficient. 3 In exchange economies, preferences are assumed to satisfy "no-consumption-externality" (individuals are not affected by others' consumption) and "monotonicity". 4 References are Hurwicz (1972) , Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) , Hurwicz and Walker (1990) , Zhou (1991a) , Schummer (1997) , and Serizawa (1998) . See also the extensive surveys by Sprumont (1995a) , Barberà (2001) , and Thomson (2001) mark (2002) . Serizawa (2000a) shows that there is no rule satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. Replacing individual rationality with a much weaker axiom, called "minimum consumption guarantee", Serizawa and Weymark (2002) establish an even stronger impossibility. Serizawa (2000b) does not impose continuity but considers a stronger non-manipulability notion, "pairwise strategy-proofness" associated with preference misrepresentation by groups consisting of at most two agents.
Continuity is desirable for the following practical reason. In order to make a choice, we need information about preferences. However, even if people are willing to reveal their own true preferences, for a number of reasons, they may not be known accurately. If a rule is not continuous, the choice it makes may be vulnerable to such inaccuracy.
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In the 2-agent and 2-good case, Sprumont (1995b) characterizes continuous and strategy-proof rules over the same homothetic domain as ours. He shows that any continuous and strategy-proof rule has the following dictatorial feature: there exists an agent and an exogenously determined strictly convex subset of consumption space such that the rule picks the best point for the agent in the set. Our results show that in the n-agent case, even if strategy-proofness is replaced with efficiency, we still have "diagonal dictatorship", which implies strong violation of most standard equity criteria.
Continuity and strategy-proofness are studied also by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981), yet on the domain consisting of only strictly convex preferences. They impose in addition, "continuous differentiability" and non-bossiness. The domain of production economies with convex technologies is one of the domains they consider, and this domain includes exchange economies. Their result for this domain implies that there exists no rule that is efficient, continuously differentiable, strategy-proof, and non-bossy. However they do not study consequences of dropping non-bossiness or weakening continuous differentiability to continuity or weakening strategy-proofness. 6 5 In the implementation literature, one of the desirable properties of a game form is continuity of its outcome function (See Postlewaite and Wettstein, 1989) . Continuity guarantees the robustness of equilibrium to small misspecifications of strategies. Outcome functions are often closely related with rules they implement. In particular, in the direct revelation mechanism, the rule coincides with the outcome function. 6 In various models, central strategy-proof rules are not differentiable. For example, in public good economies with single-peaked preference considered by Moulin (1980) , the "generalized Condorcet-winner rules", which are the only rules satisfying Pareto efficiency, anonymity, and strategy-proofness, are not differentiable. In private good economies with single-peaked preferences considered by Sprumont (1991) , the "uniform rule", which is the only rule satisfying Chichilnisky (1979 Chichilnisky ( , 1980 Chichilnisky ( , 1982 , Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) , and Zhou (1997) study continuous "preference aggregation rule", which is a function mapping each preference profile into a social "preference". These studies exhibit difficulties of satisfying continuity together with other equity criteria such as "unanimity" (similar to our efficiency) and "anonymity" (similar to equal treatment of equals). Although their results are established for "preference aggregation rules" and in the topological social choice model, our result on diagonal dictatorship has a similar flavor to theirs. This paper is composed of five sections. In Section 2, we define our model and basic concepts. In Section 3, we establish several useful lemmas. Our main results are in Section 4. We conclude with a few remarks in Section 5.
The model and basic concepts
Let l be the number of goods, l ≥ 2, and Ω ∈ R Each agent has a preference, a complete and transitive binary relation over R l + . Preferences are continuous, strictly monotonic, 7 , and convex. For each preference R 0 , we use P 0 and I 0 to denote its strict relation and indifference relation, respectively. Let R be a family of admissible preferences. Since we keep the social endowment fixed, an economy can be identified by a profile of preferences in R. An allocation rule, or simply a rule, is a function ϕ : R N → Z associating with each economy a single feasible allocation.
The following two restricted families of preferences are important. A preference R 0 is homothetic if for all x, y ∈ R l + and all α ∈ R + , x I 0 y implies αx I 0 αy. Let R H be the class of homothetic preferences. A preference R 0 is linear if it is represented by a vector p 0 ∈ R l ++ as follows: for all x, y ∈ R + , x R 0 y if and only if for example, the "Cobb-Douglas" preferences are not members of R H . However, this feature is not crucial for our result as explained in Section 5.
For each economy R ∈ R N , an allocation z ∈ Z is (Pareto) efficient if there is no feasible allocation that makes at least one agent better off without making anyone else worse off. Let P (R) be the set of all efficient allocations for R.
Domain R H is endowed with the metric ρ :
+ be the point of intersection of the ray, − → 0, q, and the indifference curve of R 0 through (1, · · · , 1) (note that r (q, R 0 ) is well-defined because preferences are strictly monotonic). For all In what follows, for any family of preferences, denoted by R, when R contains R H (or R L ), we assume that R is endowed with a topology inducing the above metric topology in the subspace R H (or R L , respectively) and that R N is endowed with the product topology associated with the topology on R. We refer readers to Kannai (1970) for a construction of topology on spaces of preferences.
Given a topology of R N , we define continuity of an allocation rule over R N in the standard way. We study efficient and continuous rules, or continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence, which are immune to the following kinds of manipulative behavior.
Most well-known is manipulation via preference misrepresentation. A rule ϕ : R N → Z is strategy-proof if no one can ever benefit by misrepresenting his preference, independently of others' representations; that is, for all i ∈ N and all
We next define three weaker notions of non-manipulability, which pertain to three types of partially strategic behavior of agents. First is the type in which each agent behaves cooperatively, truthfully representing his preference, except when he is treated worst. Each agent misrepresents his preference only to "veto" the worst outcome, namely, the zero bundle. In this case, the following weakening of strategy-proofness is important. A rule ϕ :
Second is the type in which each agent truthfully represents his preference, unless he can switch to the best outcome or escape the worst outcome, by misrepresenting his preference. Since preferences are strictly monotonic, Ω is the best outcome and 0 is the worst outcome. In this case, the following weakening of strategyproofness is important. A rule ϕ :
Third is the type in which each agent truthfully represents his preference, unless he can increase his bundle in terms of vector dominance relation, by misrepresenting his preference. In this case, the following weakening of strategy-proofness
Clearly, every rule satisfies veto-proofness if no allocation in its range has any zero component, that is, no one ever receives the zero bundle. Similarly, every rule satisfies veto-proofness * if no one ever receives either the zero bundle or Ω. Since preferences are strictly monotonic, strategy-proofness implies weak strategy-proofness, which implies veto-proofness * , which implies veto-proofness.
Our main results show that all rules satisfying the above requirements have the following "dictatorial" feature. A rule is dictatorial if there exists an agent who always gets his most preferred bundle in Z 0 . Since preferences are strictly monotonic, a rule ϕ : R N → Z is dictatorial if and only if there exists i ∈ N such that for all R ∈ R N , ϕ i (R) = Ω. We call such an agent the dictator.
an agent who receives his most preferred bundle in Z 0 at every diagonal preference profile. We call such an agent the diagonal dictator.
Every diagonally dictatorial rule violates the following standard equity crite- 
Useful lemmas
We will show later that every continuous and efficient rule selects allocations on the boundary of a predetermined "truncated (polyhedral) cone", whenever there exist at least two identical agents. In this section, we study implications of this property in conjunction with continuity and veto-proofness.
We use the following notation. For all l linearly independent vectors
Since a 1 , · · · , a l are linearly independent, then for all x ∈ R l , there exists a unique list of numbers,
When a rule satisfies Property B over the entire domain, we say that the rule satisfies Property B. For all k ∈ {1, · · · , l}, let e k be the unit vector that has 1 in its k th component and 0 in every other component. Note that when a 1 , · · · , a l are unit vectors, parts (i) and (iii) hold trivially. In this case, part (ii) says that whenever two agents have the same preferences, at least one of them receives 0 or both of them receive some positive amounts of only one and the same good.
Property B imposes a severe restriction on the choice, when there is a group I of agents who have identical preferences and who consume the entire social 9 Such a set is called "polyhedral cone". 10 The last part (
endowment in the aggregate. In this case, by part (ii), no two agents in I can consume, in the aggregate, a bundle in the interior of a 1 , · · · , a l + . Moreover, part (ii) imposes similar restrictions for all two dimensional subspaces. On the other hand, by part (i), the aggregate bundle Ω (consumed by agents in I) lies in the interior of a 1 , · · · , a l + . Since by part (iii), individual bundles should lie in a 1 , · · · , a l + , the only way to satisfy all three parts is to give a single agent in I the entire endowment Ω and all others the zero bundle, as shown by the next lemma. An allocation z ∈ Z is extreme if it is one of the following l allocations,
Proof. Suppose that ϕ satisfies Property B with respect to l linearly independent vectors a 1 , · · · , a l ∈ R l + . Without loss of generality, we may assume Ω = a 1 
j∈N \i λ jk = 1 − λ ik < 0, contradicting the fact that all λ jk 's are non-negative. Therefore, for all j ∈ I and all k ∈ {1, · · · , l}, λ jk ∈ [0, 1].
Since i∈I z i = Ω ∈ int a 1 , · · · , a l + , there exist i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, · · · , l} such that λ ik > 0. We first show λ ik = 1. Suppose, by contradiction, λ ik < 1. Then since j∈I λ jk = 1, there exists j ∈ I\i such that λ jk > 0. Take any m = k. By part (ii) of Property B, λ im = 0. Then since h∈I λ hm = 1, there exists h ∈ I\i such that λ hm > 0. This contradicts part (ii) of Property B. Therefore, λ ik = 1.
Let m ∈ {1, · · · , l}\k. We only have to show λ im = 1. If λ im < 1, then since 
. By continuity of ϕ, h is continuous. Since ϕ chooses an extreme allocation at all diagonal profiles, h has a finite range. Now we can apply the fact that if a continuous function defined over a connected space has a finite range in a Hausdorff space, then it is constant. Thus, h is constant, that is, there exists an agent i ∈ N such that for all R 0 ∈ R, h i (R 0 ) = Ω. Therefore agent i is the diagonal dictator and ϕ is diagonally dictatorial. 
The first step of the induction argument, S (0), follows directly from Lemma 2. Now suppose S (m) for m ∈ {1, · · · , n − 2}. In order to prove S(m + 1), we use the following claim. 
. Then the range of h is a finite set of extreme allocations. Since ϕ is continuous, h is also continuous. Therefore since R is connected, the range of h is a singleton. That is, there exists i ∈ N such that for
Adding veto-proofness, we obtain: 
The main results
We
following equity criteria, equal treatment of equals, no-envy, and the equal division lower bound property (Corollary 1). Also it follows from the second result that a rule over the linear domain is efficient, continuous, and (weakly) strategy-proof if and only if it is dictatorial (Corollary 2). Adding "non-bossiness" (to be defined later) introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981), we show that for any domain including the linear domain, a rule is efficient, continuous, veto-proof * (or weakly strategy-proof ), and non-bossy if and only if it is dictatorial (Theorem 3). The homothetic domain contains the linear domain and so Corollary 1 and Theorem 3 apply. In the 2-good case, we show that non-bossiness in Theorem 3 is redundant and moreover, veto-proofness * (or weak strategy-proofness) can be weakened to veto-proofness. More precisely, we show that (i) every efficient and continuous rule over the homothetic domain is diagonally dictatorial (Theorem 4) and (ii) a rule is efficient, continuous, and veto-proof if and only if it is dictatorial (Theorem 5). Veto-proofness in the second result can be replaced with any one of the three requirements, veto-proofness * , weak strategy-proofness, and strategy-proofness.
We now show that every efficient and continuous rule over the linear domain is diagonally dictatorial. LetΩ 
In the following, we define a feasible allocation that Pareto dominates z Therefore z i ∈ A ∩ B. In order to prove z j ∈ A ∩ B, we apply the same argument as above.
Since
. This is a contradiction.
If an allocation rule is diagonally dictatorial, it violates standard equity properties such as equal treatment of equals, no-envy, the equal division lower bound property, etc.
Corollary 1. Given any domain containing the linear domain, there exists no
efficient and continuous rule satisfying any one of the three equity criteria, equal treatment of equals, no-envy, and the equal division lower bound property.
The impossibility is because of extreme choices for diagonal preference profiles. And the set of diagonal preference profiles is a "measure zero" subset of the linear domain. Thus, despite the impossibility, there may exist efficient and continuous rules that behave "nicely" over the set of non-diagonal profiles.
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Our next result is that if we require veto-proofness in addition, we cannot escape dictatorship. The proof is immediate from Lemma 3 and Proof of Theorem 1.
11 For example, in the two agents and two goods economy, let ε > 0 be an arbitrary real number and 
. By definition, ϕ satisfies efficiency and continuity. Clearly, over D ε , ϕ satisfies the equal division lower bound property. However, ϕ is diagonally dictatorial, since it gives Ω to agent 1 at each diagonal profile. Thus, although ϕ is diagonally dictatorial, ϕ violates the equal division lower bound property only over R 2 L \D ε , which can be made arbitrarily small by choosing sufficiently small ε > 0. 
. Then ϕ satisfies efficiency and strategy-proofness. (ii) When veto-proofness * or weak strategy-proofness is replaced with strategyproofness, similar result holds without continuity. Serizawa (2000b) shows that a rule is efficient, strategy-proof , and non-bossy if and only if it is dictatorial.
Example 2. Define ϕ as follows: (i) if p
The homothetic domain contains the linear domain and so Corollary 1 and Theorem 3 apply. Moreover, in the 2-good case, we establish stronger results.
We consider the following union-dense family of connected subsets of the homothetic domain. We will show later that every efficient and continuous rule satisfies Property B over each of these subsets.
We first introduce useful notation.
Let X ⊆ R 2 + and R 0 , R 0 ∈ R H . We say that two preferences, R 0 and R 0 , coincide on X if the two preferences order every two bundles in X in the same way. Let x ∈ X. A vector p ∈ R 2 + is a supporting normal vector at x for R 0 if p is normal to the hyperplane through x, which supports the upper contour set (at x) of R 0 , formally, for all y ∈ R 2 + with y R 0 x, p · y ≥ p · x. We say that two preferences R 0 and R 0 have identical supporting normal vectors on X if for all x ∈ X, the set of supporting normal vectors at x for R 0 is equal to the set of supporting normal vectors at x for R 0 . We say that R 0 is strictly convex over X if for all x, x ∈ X and all λ ∈ (0, 1), if λx + (1 − λ)x ∈ X and x R 0 x, then (λx
Next we define a class of homothetic preferences that are locally linear over the cone and strictly convex outside the cone. Formally, let R H,ε ⊆ R H be the class of preferences defined as follows: for all R 0 ∈ R H , R 0 ∈ R H,ε if and only if (i) R 0 is strictly convex on R 
Assume that R i and R j have identical supporting normal vectors over R 
Next we show that z j ∈ − − → 0, z i . Suppose to the contrary that z j is not along the ray
+ that supports R i at z i and R j at z j . Then by homotheticity, p supports R i both at z i and at αz j , contradicting Claim 1.
In the 2-good case, the following three simple facts hold: (i) R H is pathconnected, (ii) for all ε > 0, R H,ε is path-connected, and (iii) ∪ ε>0 R 
The solution for (a) is b In the following argument, we first prove that for sufficiently small ρ > 0, we
We next derive a contradiction based on this fact.
Since R 0 has kinks along both two rays, − − → 0, a 
Using the same argument, we show that z 
Therefore in all three cases, z
14 Even if R and following the same arguments as above, we prove that
Taking limits in both sides of the two inequalities,
Then from the two inequalities, we obtain z j · z j ≤ 0. This implies z j = 0, contradicting our assumption.
Using Lemma 5 and the same proof as in Theorem 4, we show that if we require veto-proofness in addition, then we cannot escape dictatorship. The independence of the requirements in each of Theorem 5 and Corollary 3 can be established easily.
Discussion
1. Our diagonal dictatorship results (Theorems 1 and 4) crucially rely on the admissibility of "linear" or "locally linear" preferences. For such preferences, one may easily imagine how difficult it is to select continuously from the Pareto set. However, no earlier study has shown formally what exactly the cost of continuity is. This paper offers an answer. To attain continuity, we have to pay the cost of diagonal dictatorship, which seems to be too high.
The diagonal dictatorship result does not hold on domains consisting of only strictly convex preferences. For example, on the domain of Cobb-Douglas preferences, the "Walrasian rule", which is the rule selecting always the unique Walrasian equilibrium allocation, is efficient and continuous. Then, one may well wonder whether efficiency, continuity, and "fairness" are compatible on the full domain of continuous, strictly monotonic, and strictly convex preferences. The answer is left for future study.
2. In the n-agent exchange economies, we showed that only dictatorial rules are efficient, continuous, and strategy-proof over the linear domain and also over the 2-good homothetic domain. In proving these results, we use the diagonal dictatorship feature of efficient and continuous rules, which is a consequence of allowing linear or "locally linear" preferences. In this sense, our proof is not robust. However, we think that even if only strictly convex preferences are admissible, the same impossibility will apply. This is a natural conjecture following from the well-known conjecture by Zhou (1991) and Kato and Ohseto (2001) that the range of every efficient and strategy-proof rule contains only extreme allocations. Let us call this property the "extreme range property".
3. Recently, an important contribution is made by Serizawa and Weymark (2002) . They showed that any efficient and strategy-proof rule "cannot guarantee everyone a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin", violating the condition of "minimum consumption guarantee". This means that at least one agent receives bundles sufficiently close to the zero bundle, which is an obnoxious feature. However, it is less obnoxious than (diagonal) dictatorship or the extreme range property. This is because violation of minimum consumption guarantee does not exclude the possibility of choosing only non-extreme bundles. Thus, their result still leaves a substantial gap between "no minimum consumption guarantee" and the extreme range property, conjectured by Zhou (1991) and Kato and Ohseto (2001) . Adding continuity, their result implies that at least one agent should receive the zero bundle at some economies, which is still far from (diagonal) dictatorship or the extreme range property.
It is remarkable to note that the proof in Serizawa and Weymark (2002) is quite robust and does not rely on the admissibility of some non-standard or artificial preferences, such as linear preferences or locally linear homothetic preferences that are used in our proofs.
4. The homothetic preference domain R N H does not include preferences whose indifference curves do not intersect with all the axes, such as Cobb-Douglas preferences. However, these preferences are limit points of R H (that is, there are sequences of preferences in R H , which converge to such preferences). Hence our results can be extended over the larger domain containing R H and including such preferences.
A Topological properties of the homothetic domain in the 2-good case
In this section, we sketch the proofs of the following facts on the homothetic domain with two goods. . It is clear that R n 0 converges to R 0 as n goes to infinity. Therefore for each strictly convex preference R 0 in R H , there exists a sequence of preferences in ∪ ε>0 R H,ε that converges to R 0 .
On the other hand, as we show below, the class of strictly convex preferences is dense in R H . Let R 0 ∈ R H be convex. Pick a strictly convex preference relation R 0 ∈ R H . Let π : [0, 1] → R H be the continuous path from R 0 to R 0 defined in the proof of Fact 1. It is clear by definition that for all λ ∈ (0, 1), π(λ) is a strictly convex preference relation in R H . Let R n 0 ≡ π(1/n). Then (R n 0 ) n∈N is a sequence of strictly convex preference relations that converges to R 0 .
Therefore ∪ ε>0 R H,ε is dense in R H .
